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This article is a critical reassessment of American trade in sandalwood between Hawaii and 
China from 1790-1832. It makes three contributions to the historiography of early com-
merce in the Pacific. First, it argues that American navigators did experiments with san-
dalwood throughout the 1790s. Second, it presents a price history that corroborates the 
influence of geopolitics upon the development of the sandalwood trade. Third, it demons-
trates that a combination of deforestation, competition, and market saturation contribu-
ted to the decline of the trade in the 1820s.
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Resumo
“Muito aborrecido e um negócio que nunca deveria ter sido feito”: uma reavaliação 
do comércio americano de sândalo entre o Havaí e a China, 1790-1832
Este artigo é uma reavaliação crítica do comércio americano de sândalo entre o Havai e a 
China entre 1790 e 1832. Faz três contribuições para a historiografia do comércio inicial no 
Pacífico. Primeiro, argumenta que os navegadores americanos fizeram experiências com o 
sândalo ao longo da década de 1790. Segundo, apresenta um histórico de preços que cor-
robora a influência da geopolítica no desenvolvimento do comércio de sândalo. Terceiro, 
demonstra que uma combinação de desflorestação, competição e saturação do mercado 
contribuiu para o declínio do comércio na década de 1820.




«Très ennuyeux & sans affaires à faire»: une réévaluation du commerce américain de 
bois de santal entre Hawaï et la Chine, 1790-1832
Cet article est une réévaluation critique du commerce américain de bois de santal entre 
Hawaï et la Chine entre 1790 et 1832. Il apporte trois contributions à l’historiographie des 
premiers échanges commerciaux dans le Pacifique. Tout d’abord, il soutient que les naviga-
teurs américains ont expérimenté le bois de santal tout au long des années 1790. Ensuite, il 
présente une histoire des prix qui corrobore l’influence de la géopolitique dans le dévelop-
pement du commerce du bois de santal. Pour finir, il prouve qu’une combinaison de défo-
restation, de concurrence et de saturation du marché a contribué au déclin de ce commerce 
dans les années 1820.
Keywords: bois de santal, maritime, américains, Hawaï, commerce de la Chine.
Introduction
In May 1823, Charles Hammatt, commercial agent for the Bostonian firm of 
Bryant & Sturgis, disembarked at Honolulu. The Hawaiian Islands were beautiful, 
no doubt, but other considerations weighed on his mind. William Heath Davis, a 
legendary sandalwood trader, had died. Moreover, the sandalwood trade itself 
seemed to have imploded over the previous eighteen months. In July, after a frui-
tless struggle to recover debts and revive the sandalwood trade, Hammatt remar-
ked that Honolulu “is very dull & no business doing.” He resolved “to send the ship 
on a cruise around the islands, with the possibility of collecting some wood” but 
confided that “my expectations are not great.” In August, when the vessel returned 
to Honolulu, he concluded that “the Ship has done much as I expected, tho’ that is 
very little” (Hammatt, 1999: 6-7, 20-21). 
The American sandalwood trade began as an outgrowth of the more exten-
sive transpacific fur trade between Northwestern America and China. Companions 
of Captain Cook first discovered that otter skins “which did not cost the purcha-
ser six-pence sterling sold in China for 100 dollars,” an astronomical profit mar-
gin (Ledyard, 1783: 69-70). British captains pioneered the maritime fur trade in 
the 1780s, often punctuating the long voyage with a replenishment stop in the 
Hawaiian Islands. In 1788, Columbia and Lady Washington, Bostonian fur-tra-
ding ships, became the first American vessels to cruise the Pacific. From the begin-
ning, Americans looked for other branches of commerce to offset the unpredicta-
ble market in furs. Hawaiian sandalwood was the first such opportunity.
Sandalwood, genus Santalum, is an aromatic hardwood native to the tro-
pics. One of the most valuable commercial tree species, sandalwood contains the 
compound santalol (C15H24O) which emits a “sweet, fragrant, persistent aroma” 
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(Subasinghe, 2013: 1). Four species, out of sixteen worldwide, are endemic to the 
Hawaiian Islands. Sandalwood (‘iliahi) was traditionally used as ritual firewood, as 
well as in the making of medicines, perfume, and musical instruments. In China, 
sandalwood (tanxiang, 檀香) was used in the manufacture of drugs, cosme-
tics, incense, furniture, and funeral pyres (Merlin and VanRavenswaay, 1990: 50). 
Sometime around 1790, American navigators began an experimental trade in san-
dalwood between producers in Hawaii and consumers in China.
The sandalwood trade suffered from a paradoxical fate—becoming commer-
cially viable, only to collapse a few years later. How did this happen? The historio-
graphy of the Pacific sandalwood trade is thin. The sole monograph concerning this 
fascinating subject is Dorothy Shineberg’s They Came for Sandalwood: A Study 
of the Sandalwood Trade in the South Pacific, 1830-1865 (1967). Nonetheless, 
Shineberg concentrates upon later developments in Melanesia rather than upon 
the Hawaiian origins of the business. “The Sandalwood Trade of Early Hawaii” 
offers a retrospective view of the sandalwood trade, albeit in a journalistic form 
suitable for Thrum’s Hawaiian Almanac (1904). More recently, scientists and his-
torians published a collection of articles as the Proceedings of the Symposium on 
Sandalwood in the Pacific (1990). Sandalwood also assumed a central place in Paul 
Fontenoy’s short article “Ginseng, Otter Skins, and Sandalwood: The Conundrum 
of the China Trade” (1997). James Gibson gave a shorter treatment of its signifi-
cance as an outgrowth of the maritime fur trade in Otter Skins, Boston Ships, 
and China Goods (1992). James Fichter’s So Great a Proffit (2010) situated the 
sandalwood trade among various U.S. industries that undermined the commercial 
muscle of the British East India Company. Despite occasional appearances in the 
historiography of the Pacific World, however, no full treatment of the American 
trade in Hawaiian sandalwood exists.
This essay offers a critical reassessment of the American sandalwood trade, 
and it makes three contributions to the commercial historiography of the Pacific 
World. First, I contend that consistent experimentation with sandalwood began a 
decade earlier than is commonly recognized. In contrast to writers who deemed 
the origins of the trade to be “unknown,” documentary evidence suggests that 
American captains tested the commodity throughout the 1790s (Thrum, 1904: 48). 
Second, I present the first price history for sandalwood imports at Canton, in China. 
Quantitative analysis enables us to corroborate or discern the impact of geopo-
litical events (embargos, piracy, and conflicts) upon the development of a relia-
ble, profitable trade. Third, I argue that the collapse of the sandalwood trade from 
1822-32 resulted from more than a glut of “inferior” produce on the market. In fact, 
the decline of sandalwood must be attributed to a constellation of factors inclu-
ding deforestation, competition, and market saturation. These conclusions contri-
bute to our understanding of sandalwood as a business that helped to bridge the 
U.S. transition from the maritime fur trade to more permanent models of shipping 
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in the Pacific. I emphasize that the conclusions in this article are tentative, and that 
further research on the subject is warranted.
1. Revisiting the early sandalwood trade
The documentary record strongly indicates that the sandalwood trade began 
around 1790. Joseph Felgelson, a forester, incorrectly claimed that “Sandalwood 
has been of historical importance since it was first exported in 1778” (Felgelson, 
1990: 42). There is no evidence, however, that Cook’s companions collected 
Hawaiian sandalwood or recognized its commercial value. King Kalakaua recoun-
ted a legend that “in 1787 several trading vessels visited the group, and the nati-
ves began to barter provisions and sandal-wood for firearms and other weapons 
of metal.” This chronology, presented as an example of “fabulous folklore,” may 
represent the conflation of multiple events (Kalakaua, 1888: 26-27). In 1788, William 
Douglas, a British captain, received instructions to reconnoiter the North Pacific and 
“lade on board as much as you can… of sandel-wood” (Meares, 1791, II: appendix). 
In 1790, he stationed two crewmembers at Maui to collect ‘iliahi, but their mission 
failed when the local ruler “threw off his protection” of them (Ingraham, 1971: 78, 
82-83). It is also possible that Douglas shipped an “inferior quality” of wood, and 
there is no indication that he made a second attempt (Gibson, 1992: 254). Amaso 
Delano, an American captain, claimed that “as long ago as the year 1790, I saw 
more than thirty tons of what was called sandal wood brought from these islands 
to Canton” (Delano, 1817: 399). The precision of that date is questionable, but 1790 
also approximates several events surrounding John Kendrick, the first American to 
navigate the Pacific Ocean. 
One tradition suggests that Kendrick, commander of the Columbia expedi-
tion, pioneered the sandalwood trade between the Hawaiian Islands and China. 
In fact, Kendrick’s appropriation of the brig Lady Washington may have neces-
sitated an experiment in sandalwood. His decision to “take the Brig on my own 
account… and abide by all losses and gains” divided the expedition and left him in 
desperate need of operating funds (Howay, 1941: 471). Kendrick’s subsequent acti-
vities have proven difficult to reconstruct, but he is documented to have repleni-
shed at the Hawaiian Islands in 1789 (Howay, 1928: 37). Tradition holds that his dis-
covery of ‘iliahi was “accidental” and arising “in the purchase of firewood” (Thrum, 
1904: 48). Ralph Kuykendall concluded that “it is altogether probable that sticks of 
this fragrant wood were included in batches of firewood delivered to trading ships 
and that its existence on the islands was discovered by the traders in this way” 
(Kuykendall, 1934; 370). The tale may be apocryphal, or even the inspiration for a 
later legend that John Jacob Astor “enjoyed a monopoly” on Santalum after one 
of his captains purchased it as fuel. (BHS, 1929: 15). George Vancouver reported 
that, in 1791, Kendrick left three crewmembers in the islands “for the purpose of 
collecting sandal-wood, and pearls” (Vancouver, 1798, I: 172).
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New evidence—albeit of a circumstantial nature—also suggests that Kendrick 
received market intelligence from his colleagues aboard Columbia. Captain Robert 
Gray documented the price of four grades of sandalwood at Canton. Gray obser-
ved that “Sandall Wood, first sort” sold at an astonishing $55 dollars per picul. Even 
third-rate varieties fetched an appealing sum of $28 (Columbia Papers I, 1787-1793). 
He also corresponded with Kendrick during his reconnaissance of the Hawaiian 
Islands. Gray made no mention of sandalwood, but he reported that the inhabi-
tants of Niihau had few “curiosities” to trade because William Douglas—a rival 
sandalwood captain—had already “drained them of those articles.” Could this be 
an oblique reference to ‘iliahi, an untested commodity? Gray deposited a second 
letter (now lost, contents unknown) at Kauai—an island Kendrick later targeted for 
sandalwood (Nokes, 1991: 285). Moreover, Columbia’s carpenter remained on the 
“big island” of Hawaii. Historians have described Isaac Ridler as a “deserter,” but the 
evidence does not support this characterization. Ridler’s expertise in the proces-
sing of wood suggests that he remained in the archipelago as a purchasing agent 
for Kendrick (Bradley, 1939: 286; Ingraham, 1972: 78).
The following decades, 1790-1810, probably saw greater experimentation 
with sandalwood than prior historians have recognized. Kuykendall believed that 
“the sandalwood trade of Hawaii was not of a great importance much before 1810,” 
although he affirmed that “the wood was being exported in a small way for seve-
ral years prior to that date” (Kuykendall, 1934: 370). Harold St. John couched the 
trade in purely hypothetical terms, arguing that “from 1790 to 1810 sandalwood 
may have been exported, but if so, in very small quantity, for little record is found” 
(St. John, 1947: 6). Prior historians were correct in their assessment that ‘iliahi is 
poorly attested in sources from 1792-1804. However, one must read between the 
lines in cases where multiple societies, languages, and cultural traditions are at 
play. Delano remarked, in the context of expeditions between 1801 and 1806, that 
Americans discovered “within the past seven or eight years a considerable quan-
tity of sandal-wood, and… made large profits by the traffic”. If true, his statement 
indicates the establishment of a viable trade sometime between 1794 and 1799 
(Delano, 1817: 399).
The prevailing historiographical attitude toward sandalwood is best illustra-
ted in the editorial notes to Joseph Ingraham’s Journal of the Brigantine Hope. 
In 1791, Ingraham learned that American vessels were “taking in sandalwood” and 
that islanders even used the commodity as bait in their attempt to capture the 
brig Eleanora. Ingraham did not question the ruse—he regarded sandalwood as 
an element of “trading as usual.” Robert Kaplanoff, a modern editor, dismissed the 
account as an “error about the Eleanora’s business” and suggested that “appa-
rently, she was only taking on firewood.” His conclusion is problematic in several 
ways. Ingraham received the report from a professional who understood the status 
of sandalwood: the carpenter, Isaac Ridler (Ingraham, 1972: 79). Other navigators 
heard similar accounts from individuals associated with Eleanor (Boit, 1981: 73). 
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Material culture reinforces the reliability of the source. Hawaiians did differentiate 
between mundane wood and ‘la’au ‘ala, or aromatic wood, but both could be con-
sidered “firewood” (Merlin and VanRavenswaay, 1990: 49-50). Traders may have 
used the term interchangeably in the context of a commercial pidgin later known 
as “Sandalwood English” (Drechsel, 2014: 7-11).
The early absence of sources concerning sandalwood is frequently taken as 
confirmation that the initial cargo represented “an inferior kind… and the Chinese 
would not give anything for it” (Delano, 1817: 399). This much could be true. 
Outsiders could easily mistake naio or “false sandalwood,” another aromatic hard-
wood, for the real item (Malo, 1898: 42; USDA, 1989: 4). Vancouver inspected a spe-
cimen but explained that it “seemed but lightly to answer the description given of 
the yellow sandal wood of India” and that his expedition was “not able… to deter-
mine its particular class or species” (Vancouver, 1798, I: 189). A botanical error could 
explain the failure of a cargo or two. It strains credulity, though, to suggest that 
traders shipped the wrong species for more than a decade. Published narratives 
of scientific navigation offered ample knowledge concerning the natural wealth of 
the Pacific World. Santalum appeared in references to a hardwood “which is burnt 
for people of distinction,” a species resembling “mahogany,” and “shrubs… used 
as a perfume in the east” (Bougainville, 1772: 269; Quimper, 1791: 36; Flinders, 1814, 
II: 171). Time was money, and most fur traders made frequent visits to the islands. 
Those returning from Canton could identify “true” sandalwood on sight (Perkins, 
1856: 41). If John Kendrick failed to acquire true ‘iliahi during his 1789 visit, or even 
in 1791, we cannot doubt he attempted to upon returning in 1793. In short, the 
botanical error was easy to correct.
How can we explain the documentary silence concerning sandalwood during 
a period of clear experimentation in the commodity? The best explanation is that 
sandalwood did not become a significant cargo item until 1804-05. American tra-
ders could not be considered “sandalwooders” prior to this period, as ‘iliahi remai-
ned secondary to their main line of business—animal furs. Traders diversified their 
fur cargoes with smaller quantities of sandalwood, pearls, ambergris, and trepang 
(Gibson, 1993: 132, 156-59). Early shipments of sandalwood were small, unofficial 
affairs. Hawaiian nobles often presented foreigners with ceremonial gifts such as 
“a large log of sandalwood” (Bloxam, 1925: 72). Other traders accepted ‘iliahi in 
exchange for services rendered, and one received “passage money” in the form of 
“sandalwood to the value of $1,000” (Lydgate, 1916: 37). Most “shipments,” howe-
ver, originated in barter between individual Americans and Hawaiians. In acqui-
ring “wood as handsome as mahogany,” officers availed themselves of a traditional 
right to “personal trade” (Townsend, 1921: 28). These forms of sandalwood “cargo” 
occurred informally, and none warranted inclusion in official ship manifests, logs, 
or letters.
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2. The market for sandalwood, 1804-1832
Beginning in 1804, documentary evidence is adequate to construct an estimated 
price history for the American sandalwood trade in the Pacific. The disjointed cha-
racter of the evidence, however, may explain why no historian has done so before 
now. The principal sources are incomplete in their treatment of sandalwood ton-
nages, prices, and earnings. As a result, they present some problems of reconcilia-
tion and calculation. Charles Gutzlaff published a table of American sandalwood 
imports at Canton, by weight, in A Sketch of Chinese History, Vol. II (1838). Hosea 
Ballou Morse included reference to sandalwood tonnage, price, and earnings data 
throughout five volumes of The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading 
to China, 1635-1834 (1926). Timothy Pitkin recorded a decade sandalwood 
imports at Canton, by gross earnings, in A Statistical View of the Commerce 
of the United States of America (1835). Other data is drawn from scattered ship 
journals, prices current, and other minor sources.
Gutzlaff presented data that approximates, but does not match, American 
imports as documented by the East India Company (E.I.C.). The discrepancies could 
represent trade secrets, smuggling, errors of documentation, or other unknowns. 
Gutzlaff did, however, supply a consistent record of imports from 1804-1832. For 
this reason, he provides the main source for import tonnages (Gutzlaff, 1838, II: 
Appendix IV). In comparison, Morse gave a fragmented account of sandalwood 
tonnages, with successive years of data available only for 1811-1812. Nevertheless. 
E.I.C. documents present a relatively consistent account of prices from 1817-1832. 
The documents also include gross earnings or profits realized in other years. Where 
this information is known in conjunction with tonnage, it becomes possible to esti-
mate a sales price for sandalwood. As a result, Morse serves as the main source for 
sandalwood prices (Morse, 1929, III-IV). It is noteworthy that Pitkin’s data diverges 
from Morse in some trading seasons (1817-1821) and matches in others (1822-1826). 
Considering this, I treat Pitkin as the authoritative source for American earnings 
during that decade (Pitkin, 1835: 304).
Some caveats are warranted. As demonstrated above, Cantonese merchants 
purchased multiple grades of sandalwood: first, second, third, and “Timore” 
(Columbia Papers I, 1787-1793). Most sources, however, record a single price—likely 
the premium grade. This assumption cannot be confirmed, making a clear diffe-
rentiation between prices impossible. This essay generalizes upon an assumption 
that American captains trafficked in the same species and grade (pending ecologi-
cal constraints). Unfortunately, the sources do not afford greater clarity. Americans 
also drew upon multiple supplies of sandalwood in the Pacific. The Hawaiian archi-
pelago constituted the most lucrative supplier, but traders also acquired wood at 
Fiji, the Marquesas, “New Holland” and unnamed “islands of the Pacific.” (Morse, 
1929, III: 3-4, 104, 176, 215). The sources make little distinction between points of 
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origin, but it is logical to presume that most shipments came from the Hawaiian 
Islands. The documented imports at Canton correspond to a period of declining 
production in Fiji and the Marquesas, leaving the Hawaiian Islands as the most 
likely supplier. (Shineberg, 1967: 7-8; Fontenoy, 1997: 11; Fichter, 2010: 219). Further 
research is warranted to illuminate these blind spots.
The construction of a price history also depends upon conversion between 
multiple currencies of the Pacific and Indian Ocean Worlds. Traders purchased 
Hawaiian sandalwood through barter in textiles, firearms, manufactured goods, 
and services, making the calculation of “purchase price” too abstract to be use-
ful. Sandalwood transactions in China are recorded in a selection of six currencies 
(Chinese Taels, British Pounds, Spanish Dollars, Star Pagodas, Sikka Rupees, and 
Arcot Rupees).1 Cantonese exchange rates between the silver currencies (Taels, 
Pounds, Dollars) remained fixed throughout the sandalwood era, easing the cal-
culation of transactions in China. Minor fluctuations occurred with respect to E.I.C. 
coinage (Pagodas and Rupees), which floated in rough proportion to the British 
Pound. For this reason, calculations are less reliable where evidence rests upon 
sandalwood purchased in India (Dubost, 1806: 183, 340; Milburn, 1813: 471; Morse, 
1929, I: xxii).
1 Morse explained that E.I.C. accounts recognized a fixed exchange rate for sterling [£1 = 3 Taels]. Spanish 
Dollars also maintained a fixed rate [$1 = 0.72 Taels] until 1815. Thereafter, the Spanish Dollar was “invoiced 
at the actual cost (c.i.f.) per oz.,” although the E.IC. records a minor variation from the previous value only 
in 1818 [0.7199 Taels]. The stability of exchange rates eases our ability to estimate the sales price of sandal-
wood (Morse, 1929 II: xxii, II-III passim). The U.S. dollar also experienced minor fluctuations versus the Spanish 
Dollar. Timothy Pitkin appears to have treated them as interchangeable for purposes of his data (Pitkin, 1834: 
304). Joseph Blunt gave the exchange rate for Indian currencies as: 1 Star Pagoda = 7s 5¼d [£0.3719]; and 1 
Arcot Rupee = 23¼d [£0.0968]. His numbers account for the introduction of standardized Rupees after 1818, 
but the earlier currencies remained in circulation and continued to appear in E.I.C. records (Blunt, 1837: 371-
72). Christopher Dubost provided a rate where 1 Sikka Rupee = 0.9309 Arcot Rupees or approximately 21⅔d 
[£0.0902] (Dubost, 1806: 103).
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1805 1,600 44,445 27.78
1806 2,700 72,900 27.00
1807 2,000
1808 4,800
1809 1,815 34,032 18.75
1810 496 9,920 20.00
1811 11,261
1812 19,036 394,045 20.70*




1817 15,825 174,075 166,200 11.00
1818 14,874 91,368 6.14
1819 10,073 82,228 101,228 8.16
1820 6,005 67,133 11.18
1821 26,822 268,220 269,320 10.00
1822 20,653 139,408 139,408 10.00 6.75
1823 8,404 67,232 67,232 8.50 8.00
1824 7,438 66,942 66,942 9.00
1825 3,097 32,518 32,518 10.50
1826 6,680 83,500 83,500 12.50
1827 13,265 211,070 11.50 15.91
1828 18,206 127,442 7.00 7.00
1829 10,807 43,228 4.75 4.00
1830 9,750 39,000 4.25 4.00
1831 1,400 7,000 5.00
1832 5,600 28,000 5.00
All values given in Spanish Dollars. Import volume drawn from Gutzlaff. Italics indicate total sales 
calculated from a combination of import volume (piculs) and sale value ($/picul). Price calculations 
are made with a first preference for sale values given in Pitkin (1835), which may represent the most 
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accurate picture of U.S. imports during the decade 1817-1826. Second preference is given to sale 
values provided in Morse (1929), and third preference given to sales reconstructed from ancillary data 
in Morse. Prices marked with an asterisk (*) are derived entirely from data in Morse. See exchange rates 
cited above.
Sources: GIBSON, 1992: 256; GUTZLAFF, 1838, II: appendix IV; MILBURN, 1823, II: 491; MORSE 1929, III: 
3-4, 104, 158, 176, 205-06, 228, 307, 328, 330-31, 344, 346, 368-69; MORSE, 1929, IV: 4, 20, 67, 84, 88, 99, 
118, 121, 127, 139, 143, 158, 181, 191, 248, 271, 339.; New York Herald (25 June 1806), 2; PITKIN, 1835: 
304; ROQUEFUEIL, 1823: 52-53.
3. Obstacles to trade, 1791-1814 
American merchant-captains experimented with sandalwood in both formal and 
informal ways from 1791-1814, but their experience did not immediately result in 
reliable trade. What explains their failure to capitalize on a promising new commo-
dity? With the possible exception of Hawaiian political upheavals in 1795, there was 
no significant obstacle to the acquisition of ‘iliahi. Sandalwood was widely availa-
ble in the early years. A growing—although sensitive—market waited at Canton. 
One explanation is that the Pacific sandalwood trade came of age during a time of 
geopolitical instability.
The beginning of the sandalwood trade corresponds to a period of inter-
mittent warfare between rival kingdoms administered from the islands of Hawaii 
and Maui. The most powerful warlords funded the modernization of their forces 
through the sale of sandalwood. Vancouver observed that Kamehameha sold 
Hawaiian goods at the cost of “arms and ammunition.” The importation of firearms, 
he noted, “has produced in every chief of consequence an inordinate thirst for 
power” and “great avidity for these destructive engines.” (Vancouver, 1798, I: 186-
87). Sandalwood also purchased heavier weapons. One visitor later reported that 
“there were from 600 to 700 pieces of artillery upon the several islands” (Bloxam, 
1824: 34). Kamehameha financed an ambitious program of naval armament, 
featuring shipyards and a blacksmith forge, in part with exports of sandalwood 
(Townsend, 1921: 23-34). The fiscal demands of unification and state-formation 
prompted nobles to harvest enormous quantities of ‘iliahi. The islands exported 
an estimated 6.1 million pounds of wood, worth perhaps $576,000, during the first 
decade of documented exports (1804-1813). In short, sandalwood was available 
and profitable to the producers. Challenges to the development of a reliable trade 
did not originate on the supply side.
Instead, Americans encountered demand-side obstacles to their develop-
ment of a sandalwood trade at Canton. Competition from preexisting business 
was a significant hindrance. Chinese consumers had a longstanding relationship 
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with tanxiang, and they obtained aromatic wood through a succession of middle-
men prior to the arrival of Americans. Sandalwood appears in Chinese documents 
as early as 454, and Cambodian vessels made deliveries throughout the following 
century (Schafer, 1957: 130; Wang, 1958: 53). Thereafter, Arabian and Malay cap-
tains imported sandalwood along with resins such as frankincense, aloes, and cam-
phor (Morley, 1949: 145, 164; Villiers, 2001: 27-28). Demand for tropical aromatics 
boomed in parallel with globalization during the Song, Yuan, and Ming Dynasties 
(Ptak, 2006: 484-85; Soon, 2001: 146). Cantonese captains sought tanxiang in dis-
tant Sumatra, India, and perhaps Africa (Sen, 2006: 424). Europeans dominated the 
trade in aromatics after 1750, and they regarded sandalwood as a “cornerstone” of 
the China Trade (Morse, 1922: 251). The incomplete nature of the evidence makes it 
impossible to know the overall scale of tanxiang imports at Canton, but Americans 
clearly entered an established market.
The delicate balance of supply and demand also complicated American trade. 
Prior to U.S. involvement, Chinese demand for tanxiang rested at an equilibrium 
price of around $20-24 per picul (133⅔ pounds) and prices occasionally spiked as 
high as $31 (Morse, 1929, II: 70). Beginning in 1804, American traders flooded the 
market, with predictable results. Over the subsequent decade, U.S. vessels impor-
ted 45,708 piculs of sandalwood, representing fully 52% of all documented imports 
and doubling the overall supply. The glut of tanxiang was particularly noticeable 
from 1811-1812, when Americans imported 4,000,000 pounds of wood—three 
times the reported E.I.C. volume. In 1812, the outbreak of war between the United 
States and Great Britain prevented the market from reaching a terminal state of 
saturation. The following year, prices rebounded by 23% when “the war kept 
American ships away from Canton, or at any rate much diminished their number” 
(Morse, 1929, III: 191). In short, conflict sustained the delicate market for aromatic 
wood.
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1809 1,815 9,650 11,465 15.83
1810 496 7,588 8,084 6.14
1811 11,261 4,067 15,328 73.47
1812 19,036 5,559 24,595 77.40
1813 1,100 15,108 16,208 6.79
1814 7,162 7,162










1825 3,097 574 8,011 11,682 26.51
1826 6,680 1,793 8,473 78.84
1827 13,265 13,265
1828 18,206 9,892 28,098 64.79
1829 10,807 16,697 27,504 39.29
1830 9,750 11,100 20,850 46.76
1831 1,400 6,338 7,738 18.09
1832 5,600 2,075 7,675 72.96
Total 234,507 57,184 68,368 360,059 45.03
This chart does not present U.S. percentage share for seasons when company and private tonnages 
are unknown (either due to absence of imports or omission).
Sources: GUTZLAFF, 1838, II: appendix IV; MORSE ,1929, III: 3-4, 104, 158, 176, 205-06, 228, 307, 328, 330-
31, 344, 346, 368-69; IV: 4, 20, 67, 84, 88, 99, 118, 121, 127, 139, 143, 158, 181, 191, 248, 271, 339.
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Recent scholarship reflects a growing consensus that protracted warfare from 
1793 to 1815 promoted the economic growth of neutral or “weak” nations such 
as the United States. One argument holds that neutral states experienced econo-
mic growth as suppliers and markets to more powerful belligerents. In this res-
pect, the American China Trade represented part of a larger expansion of trade 
to nations other than Great Britain and France (Land et al., 2018: 29-30, 42). James 
Fichter emphasizes that U.S. traders entered the commercial breach in a manner 
that presented the East India Company with “a new and vigorous competitor in 
Asia” (Fichter, 2010: 4). The American sandalwood trade demonstrates a variation 
on the theme. U.S. traders certainly benefitted from access to producers on “neu-
tral” islands, but political tensions and warfare often hindered their ability to deli-
ver sandalwood to Canton.
Geopolitical interruptions contributed to the fitful development of the sandal-
wood trade. Some obstacles resulted from the Qing Imperial practice of using com-
merce as a political weapon. In 1791, imperial officials extended an embargo against 
Russian merchants to include the maritime fur trade in general. In 1810, Cantonese 
officials threatened another embargo over issues of unpaid duties, smuggling, and 
an ongoing murder investigation. Chinese pirates also attacked, captured, and ran-
somed foreign ships with impunity (Fu, 1966: 319-20, 360). European merchantmen 
soon sailed under escort, but U.S. warships were too few to protect to sandalwood 
traders in the Pacific (Morse, 1929, III: 116). Other interruptions originated in the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In 1797, Bostonian merchant Thomas 
Handasyd Perkins complained of the “vile conduct of the Republican Cruisers” and 
feared that “privateers may be troublesome in the Straights of Sunda next spring.” 
Thereafter, Perkins reaffirmed his determination “to concentrate our property in 
the Canton trade,” but his plans faltered during Jefferson’s notorious embargo of 
1807-1809 (Perkins, 1944: 54, 64, 98; Morse, 1929, III: 77).
American efforts to establish the sandalwood trade became doubly difficult 
when European affairs intruded upon the Canton System. In 1808, the British 
occupation of Portuguese Macao—still Qing territory—brought Atlantic warfare 
to the shores of China. In response, the emperor punished “the barbarian soldiers 
of England” by threatening a blockade of foreign communications and supplies 
(Fu, 1966: 371-73). From 1808-10, American sandalwood imports plummeted from 
4,800 piculs to 496 piculs, a 90% decline. The eruption of the Anglo-American War, 
in 1812, represented the culmination of two decades of uncertain trade. Cantonese 
officials reported that the nations had begun “plundering each other’s goods and 
money” in the South China Sea. Qing authorities insisted that the belligerents 
should “obey and respect the prohibitions of the Celestial Empire” and demanded 
that British privateers not attempt “to obtain revenge on the Americans here” (Fu, 
1966: 371-73). By and large, U.S. traders elected to remain in port, in the islands, or 
to sail homeward during the conflict (Howay, 1973: 92-102). American sandalwood 
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imports collapsed in wartime, falling from the robust volume of 19,036 piculs in 
1812 to nothing in 1814. Overall, the sandalwood trade faced interruptions from 
embargos, piracy, or armed conflict in 13 of 23 seasons from 1791-1814.
4. The decline and fall of sandalwood, 1821-32
In 1815, following the war, American sandalwood traders returned to Canton and 
again saturated the market. From this point onward, no serious interruptions hin-
dered the development of a reliable trade in ‘iliahi. Indeed, American traders 
dominated the Hawaii-China circuit in increasing numbers after 1815. One diplo-
mat estimated that at least five U.S. vessels, averaging 200-300 tons burden, traded 
sandalwood each year (Bland, 1834: 311). Stability, however, brought new problems. 
The American trade that seemed so promising in the 1790s, and appeared within 
reach after 1804, began a terminal slide in 1822. In short, sandalwood became a 
victim of its own success. 
Scholars long ago identified some general reasons for the decline and fall of 
sandalwood, but their explanations lack chronological and causal nuance. Mark 
Merlin, a botanist, claimed that “the price fell in the later 1820’s as a result of poor 
quality” (Merlin and VanRavenswaay, 1990: 50). In fact, prices began their dramatic 
slide in 1817. Paul Fontenoy explained that “the assault on the sandalwood forests 
was so devastating that the trade effectively ceased by 1829 due to over-cutting.” 
The impact of intensive harvesting cannot be denied, but this explanation neglects 
the prohibitive cost of harvesting alternative species of Santalum. Fontenoy iden-
tifies the competitive role of Fijian and Marquesan sandalwood, from 1804-17, but 
he overlooks the growth of Melanesian production in the 1820s (Fontenoy, 1997: 
11-12). The remainder of this essay considers a constellation of factors in the decline 
of ‘iliahi.
The period from 1817-21 represented a sweet spot in the sandalwood trade. 
Chinese demand for sandalwood was underserved from 1814-16, when imports 
totaled only 53% of the previous three-year period (1811-13). Americans returned 
with ample cargos—more than 9.8 million pounds!—from 1817-21. The glut of san-
dalwood drove sale prices downward, but not catastrophically. In fact, tanxiang 
settled at a plateau around $10 by 1817. The most profitable year for American tra-
ders, 1821, saw peak imports of 1,788 tons and earnings of $269,000. During this 
intermediate period, then, trade probably approached an equilibrium of supply 
and demand. The American sandalwood trade would never again be so robust 
or profitable. In 1822, the market for tanxiang was so near saturation that the 
import of 20,653 piculs (1,377 tons), triggered a collapse in demand. Sales prices 
fell 33%, from roughly $10 to $6.75 per picul, in a single year. Prices continued to 
slide throughout the decade (despite a few healthy seasons), ultimately reaching 
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the abysmal rate of $5 per picul by 1829. Three good seasons, from 1825-27, are 
probably the reason that traders did not abandon sandalwood sooner.
The decade 1822-32 witnessed the long death of the American sandalwood 
trade, but the decline of ‘iliahi represented the confluence of several factors. The 
economics of deforestation was probably a consideration. We cannot be certain 
which species early traders collected, as scientific classification began later, in 
1819 (Merlin and VanRavenswaay, 1990: 46). Two candidates grew at the docu-
mented sites of early trading. Santalum ellipticum, a shrub known as “coastal 
sandalwood,” spanned the archipelago at altitudes below 1400 meters. Santalum 
paniculatum, a tree, grows exclusively on Hawaii at altitudes below 1390 meters 
(Stemmermann, 1980: 49-52). Species native to higher elevations became impor-
tant only after the depopulation of more convenient lowland varieties. In this res-
pect, sandalwood corresponds to the larger pattern of exploitation and collapse 
of other biological resources in the region, such as sea otters, seals, and whales 
(Gibson, 1992: 175-76; Busch, 1985: 191-220; Igler, 2013: 99-127).
Deforestation appears to have occurred in a relatively short period of time—
one that corresponds to the era of reliable and moderate profits between 1817 
and 1821. Chinese demand ensured the cutting of sandalwood at an unsustaina-
ble pace. In 1817, James Hunnewell identified sandalwood as the “chief article” of 
business and a commodity so plentiful that it constituted “the standard coin” of 
the islands (Hunnewell, 1895: 16). King Kamehameha compelled commoners to 
harvest thousands of tons of ‘iliahi through corvée labor. In 1822, Gilbert Mathison 
explained that “gratuitous” labor had reduced the cost of production to “absolu-
tely nothing.” Nonetheless, he concluded that ‘iliahi was “not likely to become 
exhausted for a considerable period of time” and observed that “large forests still 
remain untouched” on Hawaii (Mathison, 1825: 450-51, 457-58). Mathison unde-
restimated the pace of deforestation. Santalum reaches commercial maturity 
only after a century of growth (USDA, 1990: 4). William Ellis observed large par-
ties of “three or four hundred people, returning with sandal wood, which they 
had been cutting in the mountains” (Ellis, 1917: 227). Natural replenishment could 
not keep up with harvests on such a scale, and some chiefs began to withhold 
supplies (Hammatt, 1999: 26).
Scarcity fueled a transition toward less accessible species of ‘iliahi and a proba-
ble spike in the cost of production. Santalum freycinetianum grows throughout 
the islands at elevations up to 1150 meters, although the best specimens prefer 
an altitude of 600+ meters. This species, which achieves a height of 80 feet and 
a diameter of 3 feet, was commercially desirable for its high output of aromatic 
heartwood (Merlin and VanRavenswaay, 1990: 46). But commercial exploitation 
decimated the coastal forests. By 1824, Andrew Bloxam remarked that he “could 
not find one sandalwood tree” in lowland Oahu because “all had probably been 
cut down about here for the purpose of barter” (Bloxam, 1925: 38). Santalum 
Eric Oakley78
haleakale, the remaining species, grows at higher elevations of 1800-2590 meters 
(Merlin and VanRavenswaay, 1990: 46). Indeed, Jacobus Boelen reported in 1828 that 
sandalwood “already… had to be fetched from the most inaccessible parts of the 
mountains” (Boelen, 1988: 76). The higher investment in labor, time, and transport 
undoubtedly increased the production cost, as well as purchase price. In a climate 
of shrinking profits, many American traders looked to alternative branches of com-
merce in goods, provisions, and shipping-for-hire.
Scarcity, competition, and declining profits contributed to the collapse of the 
American trade in Hawaiian sandalwood. The inaccessibility of mature ‘iliahi crea-
ted conditions of scarcity, such that “old fashioned good wood” became rare and 
in some places “not a stick of wood” could be found. Meanwhile, prices rose for 
specimens considered “of rather inferior quality” (Hammatt, 1999: 32, 42). Indian 
production continued to exert competitive pressure, and the exploitation of mature 
forests had begun in Melanesia. Ships laden with hundreds of tons of sandalwood 
became commonplace sights at Guam, New Guinea, and the Isle of Pines. In Canton, 
tanxiang sold at unprofitable rates. Some captains imported hundreds of tons—
and realized only a few dozen dollars (Shineberg, 1967: 9-13, 29-46, 138). In short, 
American traders found themselves trapped between a widening pair of price scis-
sors in the 1820s. In 1823, Charles Hammatt was exasperated that the brig Arab “sold 
their wood at $5/4” at Canton. He lamented that “I thought it was bad enough when 
we expected to get $10 for our wood, but losing 50 percent on that, will just about 
finish it.” (Hammatt, 1999: 32-33). Within a decade, his fellow traders followed suit.
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